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Introduction
On 15 April 1989 at the Hillsborough football ground in Sheffield, the
FA Cup semi-final match was due to take place when the South Yorkshire
police, which was responsible for crowd control, allowed too many spectators
into the Leppings Lane end of the ground. As a result, they were all crammed
into pens 3 and 4 below the West Stand causing 95 spectators to be crushed
to death, and another 400 or so to be injured. Brian Harrison was at the
ground in the West Stand. He knew that both of his brothers were in the pens
below, and he watched the scene unfold. It was clear that people were being
killed and injured. He searched unsuccessfully for his brothers, and then sat
up all night waiting for news. At 11 am the following morning he was told
that his brothers were dead. He suffered psychiatric injury as a result. His
was one of the cases considered in Alcock v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police. l Police Constable Glave was on duty in the gymnasium
where the bodies were brought. He helped to move bodies and was on duty
until 1.30 am the next morning. The dead and injured were unknown to him.
PC Glave suffered psychiatric injury, and his was one of the cases considered
by the Court of Appeal in Frost v ChiefConstable ofSouth Yorkshire Police. 2
PC Glave was successful. Brian Harrison was not, as he failed to establish a
sufficiently close relationship with his brothers, and Lord Oliver held that he
had not been exposed to a sufficiently shocking perception of the event. 3
What is the difference between the two cases?
[1992] 1 AC 310.
[1997] 1 All ER 540.
Supra n 1 at 417.
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Although in Frost, three of the successful appellants were found to be
rescuers, PC Glave, who was not a rescuer, nevertheless succeeded, because,
due to the negligence of his employer, he had been exposed to the horror of
the events.
This article seeks to examine questions raised by the differences
between the principles of law employed in the respective cases of Brian
Harrison and PC Glave, and will argue that, despite the difference in
approach, the old 'nervous shock' restrictions are alive and well and operating
in Frost, and further muddying the murky waters of psychiatric injury claims.
Legal principles - 'nervous shock'
Although the expression 'nervous shock' is anachronistic, it is useful as
shorthand to describe negligently inflicted psychiatric illness, when there is no
pre-existing relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff, and is used
here accordingly.
Primary and secondary victims
The special restrictions in nervous shock claims have developed due to
the conceptual wrangles around the concept of 'proximity'4 and this has led to
a distinction between primary and secondary victims. A primary victim is
either someone who is physically injured or is within the range of foreseeable
physical injury. 5 If the plaintiff can bring herself into the category of a
primary victim, then, subject to proving causation and showing that she is
suffering from a recognised psychiatric condition, she will succeed in
recovering damages. A secondary victim is necessarily outside the range of
foreseeable physical injury. Her psychiatric injury has been caused because
of what has happened to a primary victim. In order to succeed, the secondary
victim must satisfy three criteria. First, she must be physically close to the
4 Regarded as being part ofthe criteria of a duty of care in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, at 580, and
see the subsequent principal negligence cases such as Caparo Industries pic v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 and
Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] AC 398.
See, for example, Page v Smith [1996] AC 155, at 184.
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event which has damaged or threatened the primary victim,6 which event must
make a sudden impact on her unaided senses (the 'impact' rule); secondly, she
must have close ties of love and affection with the primary victim,? and
thirdly, the event tnust be one that is shocking to a person of normal fortitude
(the 'fortitude' rule). 8 These criteria have been the subject of much academic
criticism and accused of reflecting unjust policy considerations. 9
Rescuers
Rescuers are a special category of victim because although they may be
primary victims within the range offoreseeable physical injury, even if they
are not and have no close ties with any of the primary victims, they can
succeed. 1O This is generally regarded as being based upon policy, and this is
examined further below. As far as professional rescuers are concerned it has
been established in the House of Lords that they can recover for negligently-
inflicted physical injury, 11 but Frost was the first opportunity for an English
court to consider liability for psychiatric injury (although other police officers
involved at Hillsborough who clearly came within the category of rescuer had
their claims settled, as did some of the King's Cross firefighters).
6 11lis means being present at the event or its immediate aftermath -McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410.
7 Supra n I.
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92.
See, for example, Michael A Jones, Liability for Psychiatric Illness - More Principle, Less Subtlety? [1995]
4 Web JCLl, where the restrictions are described as 'wholly artificial and arbitrary', and Harvey Teff, The
Requirement of 'Sudden Shock' in Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Damage, [1996] Tort Law
Review, Vol 4, No 1,45.
10 See Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912, approved in McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] I
AC410.
11 Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431.
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Legal Principles - Employers' Liability
Although police officers are not employees,12 the relationship between
the Chief Constable and his officers is analogous to that of master and servant
and there was no dispute in Frost that the principles of employers' liability
could apply without modification.
The law in this area is a species of the law of negligence, and
encompasses a personal duty on the part of an employer to care for the health
and safety of its employees,13 and strict vicarious liability for the primary
negligence of employees, ie regardless of want of care on the part of the
employer. 14 In Frost there was no discussion of these two aspects, and
nothing turned on whether the breach was of the employer's primary duty of
care, or whether the liability was a vicarious one in respect of the negligence
of one or more of the police officers who mismanaged the football crowd on
that day. No doubt this reflects the fact that in both cases (employer/
employee, employee/fellow employee), there exists a prior duty of care.
However, it is likely on the facts that the liability was vicarious. 15 This article
will argue that when one considers this case from the point of view of
vicarious liability and compares it with the nervous shock cases, it results in
inconsistency, illogicality and injustice.
Proximity and employers' liability
The duty of care owed to employees, whether primary or vicariously, is
an established duty which exists by virtue of the employment relationship. It
might be thought that in the light of this, there is no place for consideration of
the concept of proximity as this is used to decide whether a duty of care was
owed in the first place. However, the damage resulting from the breach must
12 Fisher v Oldham Corpn [1930] 2 KB 364.
13 Wi/sons and Clyde Coal Ltd v English [1938] AC 57.
14 As far as the police are concerned, the vicarious liability of a Chief Constable for the acts of his officers in the
purported execution of their duty is in statutory form in section 48 of the Police Act 1964.
15 See for example the observations of Judge LJ at 574, supra n 2.
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be reasonably foreseeable. 16 This will be related to the obligations arising out
of the contract of employment, one of which is the employer's implied duty to
care for the health and safety of the employee, which includes employees'
mental health. I? The duty of the employer will be definable by reference to the
general principles of negligence. Consequently, the concept of proximity may
be relevant to consideration of foreseeability, not of any damage resulting, but
the particular type of damage such as psychiatric injury. 18
In his judgment Rose LJ brings in proximity in the following way: 'The
standard of care required in the discharge of that duty and the degree of
proximity will of course vary from case to case according, among other
matters, to the nature of the job and the degree of fortitude to be expected of
the employee.'19 The proximity requirement, therefore, is satisfied by
reference to the fortitude which it would be appropriate for an employee to
possess, depending upon the nature of the duties. Thus, the nervous shock
notions of 'impact' and 'fortitude' are being applied.
Summary of the decision in Frost
The principles of law applied by Lord Justices Rose and Henry can be
summarised as follows. First, there is a duty to both civilian and professional
rescuers. Secondly, in Page v SmitJr° Lord Lloyd's categorisation of primary
and secondary victims and the requirement that there be foreseeability of
psychiatric injury in the case of secondary victims did not apply in the present
case as his categorisation did not have rescue cases in mind. Thirdly, the
purpose of distinguishing between primary and secondary victims is to apply
limiting criteria to the latter, which do not have to be applied when there is a
16 See, for example, Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367.
17 See Walker v Northumberland County Council [1995] 1 All ER 737.
18 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co. The Wagon Mound [1961] AC 388;
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co PtyLtd, The Wagon Mound (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 617.
19 Supra n 2, at 550.
20 Supra n 5.
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pre-existing duty of care owed - here, by virtue of the master and servant
relationship.
Applying these principles to the plaintiffs, one of them, Sergeant Smith,
failed in her appeal because she was not on duty at the football ground at the
time but attended at the hospital mortuary stripping bodies and dealing with
relatives. She did not succeed as she was not a rescuer and was not at the
ground when the incident occurred. It was said that no duty was owed to her,
presumably meaning no duty in respect of psychiatric injury. The
circumstances of PC Glave have already been outlined: he succeeded because,
although not a rescuer, he had been exposed to the 'horror of the event'.
Anthony Bevis and Mark Bairstow both attempted to revive bodies. They
succeeded as rescuers participating in the immediate aftermath of the event.
Inspector White pulled people out of the congestion and joined a line of
officers passing the dead and injured from the pens. He succeeded both as a
rescuer and as an employee within the area of risk.
Judge LJ, dissenting, accepted the rescue principle but said that not all
rescuers are entitled to recover because some are primary victims (at risk of
physical injury), and others are secondary victims. The case of Knightley v
Johns21 had been cited in support of the plaintiffs. This was the case of a
police officer physically injured in a road accident as a result of a police
inspector's negligence. Judge LJ accepted the correctness of the decision
because the officer was a primary victim in the area of physical risk. If his
injuries had been psychiatric rather than physical he would have succeeded.
Judge LJ did not accept that employees are automatically primary victims by
virtue of the employment relationship. 22
At the same time as the Frost appeals, the court considered the case of
Duncan v British Coal Corporation. 23 The employee was a pit deputy at a
colliery when one of his men was crushed to death at the coal face as a result
of the employer's negligence. The plaintiff was 275 metres away and arrived
at the scene within four minutes. He spent some considerable time trying to
revive the man. In a unanimous decision the court rejected his claim. Rose
21 [1982] 1 WLR 349.
22 Supra n 2, at 574-575.
23 Supra n 2.
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LJ said that, although he was 'proximate in time', he was not 'geographically
proximate' when the incident occurred, and that, when he arrived there was no
danger to him or the deceased. Rose LJ went on to say that the first aid that
he rendered was 'plainly within the scope of his employment'.24
Frost raises considerable disquiet about the unfair contrast between the
cases of the police officers and those of the relatives of Hillsborough victims
who failed in their claims. This was alluded to in the dissenting judgment of
Judge LJ, who expressed the view that the same sorts of nervous shock control
mechanisms should apply to both types of plaintiff 25 The majority decision
however seems to be an attempt to avoid the embarrassment of the contrast
between the two sets of victims, by appearing not to deploy the principles used
in nervous shock cases at all. By placing the officers in the category of
employees the disparity issue could to some extent be avoided. After all, how
many other cases are likely to arise when the shocking event itself has been
caused by the professional rescuers involved? Henry LJ was at pains to point
out that the disparity between the success of the police officers and the failure
of the relatives was brought about by the application of different principles of
law, and not by favouritism towards police officers?6 Nevertheless, although
on the face of it, there appears to be no need for control mechanisms to be
deployed in the Frost case, an examination of the majority judgments shows
that such mechanisms are being used in the context of employers' liability,
albeit in a different way. The artificial concepts used in nervous shock in the
form of impact and fortitude permeate the decision.
Issues raised by Frost and Duncan
First, what, if any, are the implications for the primary/secondary victim
distinction? Secondly, how are the fortitude and impact rules applied?
Thirdly, what are the implications for the way in which we regard rescuers?
Fourthly, do the cases have some unacceptable implications if one considers
them in the light of employers' vicarious liability? Finally, as the disparity
24 Supra n 2, at 454.
25 Supra n 2, at 572.
26 Supra n 2, at 568.
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between the cases of Brian Harrison and PC Glave gives cause for concern,
could a more coherent result be constructed whilst still remaining within the
present framework of the law?
Primary/secondary victims
The dissenter, Judge LJ, maintains the primary/secondary distinction,
but said that these officers were not primary victims because they were not at
risk?7 He distinguishes Chadwick v British Railways Boarcf8 by stating that
there, the plaintiff was at risk. However, it is clear from that case that
personal risk was not the basis of the decision, and this was acknowledged by
the House of Lords in McLoughlin v O'Brian. 29
Rose LJ stated that the primary/secondary distinction is unnecessary in
employers' liability.30 If so, what are we to make of his statement that liability
arose in this case because the officers were exposed to the risk of physical or
psychiatric injury? If the risk was of psychiatric injury alone, then there could
only be such a risk because of the 'impact' rule. Doubting its correctness, Rose
LJ refers to the case ofRobertson v Forth Road Bridge Joint Boarcfl where
an employee failed to recover damages for psychiatric injury caused by
witnessing the death of his fellow employee who was blown over the Forth
Road Bridge as a result of the employer's negligence. He failed as he was
found to be a bystander and, as such, the employer's duty of care extended no
further than the general duty to non-employee bystanders. Henry LJ is not so
critical of the decision in Robertson, because as the event was over so quickly,
there may have been no time to 'participate' in it. The implication of Henry
LJ's statement is that in order to participate in an event it must have a
minimum temporal duration. This is hard to reconcile with Page v Smith,
27 Supra n 2, at 576.
28 Supra n 10.
29 [1983] AC 410 at419.
30 Supra n 2, at 576.
31 [1995] SLT 263, CtofSess.
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where the circumstances concerned a simple car collision, which probably
took no longer than the event in Robertson. Certainly, the degree of
temporality does not help in framing a definition. In Alcoc122 Lord Oliver
referred to a primary victim as being 'involved either mediately or
immediately' as a participant, which suggests a slightly wider interpretation
and, in any event, does not imply a required minimum duration. Similarly, to
require some form of active participation in terms of 'doing something', again,
means that Mrs Dulieu, who saw the horse van coming through the window
of the public house, would not have been the primary victim that she clearly
was. 33
It may be argued that the rejection of the primary/secondary victim
distinction in Frost was simply another way of saying that the restrictions
which give rise to the distinction in nervous shock cases do not apply here.
But that cannot be the case. Certain aspects of those rules are thought to be
relevant, namely the rules relating to impact and fortitude, the latter leading
to a distinction between two types of primary victim.
The 'Fortitude' Rule
There is a strong argument that the Court of Appeal's decision is based
upon an attempt to avoid a direct confrontation with the public policy issues
in allowing professional rescuers to recover damages for psychiatric injury.
However, Rose U stated quite clearly that professional rescuers can recover:
'The only difference between professional and non-professional rescuers is that
the former are more hardened and therefore it may be more difficult to foresee
psychiatric injury to them, but this does not change the scope of the duty
owed. ,34 By stressing the normal fortitude rule, was the court hoping that, in
dealing with foreseeability of psychiatric injury at the breach stage, this would
avoid any public policy issues which could have arisen in the prior stage of the
establishment of a duty of care?
Certainly Frost suggests that there can be two types of primary victim -
32 Supra n 1, at 407.
33 Dulieu v While & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669.
34 Supra n 2, at 546.
40
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
those who must possess some degree of normal fortitude (eg employees such
as police officers) and those who need not (plaintiffs in no pre-existing
relationship giving rise to a duty ofcare, such as the plaintiff in Page v Smith).
Rose LJ refers to the concept of normal fortitude as applying to a primary
victim:
'Once it is accepted that there is no justification for regarding physical
and psychiatric injuries as different kinds of injury, when an employer
negligently causes physical injury to one employee, it seems to me to be
impossible to contend that he is not equally liable to a fellow employee
of normal fortitude working on the same task who sustains psychiatric
injury, whether through fear for himself or through witnessing what
happens to his fellow workman'.35
It could be argued that the reference to normal fortitude in Frost was
another way of saying that it would not have been foreseeable by the employer
that psychiatric damage would have resulted unless the event was such as to
cause psychiatric injury in one of normal fortitude. However, that is precisely
what the normal fortitude rule is about outside the context of employers'
liability. In Page v Smith the foreseeability of physical injury was enough. Is
the implication ofFrost that the duty owed to the officers qua employees will
vary so that, if the negligent act does not put them at risk physically, then
psychiatric injury is unforeseeable? This cannot be the case because it does
not square with the judgment of Rose LJ referring to those being within the
area of risk of physical or psychiatric injury, and his conclusion that liability
arises because of exposure to the horror. Further, if they are found to be at
risk of psychiatric injury only, then (and this is one of the controversial aspects
of the decision), they are in a better position than a bystander. The suggestion
by Henry LJ that this can be countered by the fact that those who were there
carrying out their duties had no choice but to be there36 does not meet the
objection that non-employees may not have had a choice in the moral sense
(eg off-duty professionals and civilian helpers not classifiable as rescuers).
35 Supra n 2. at 550
36 Supra n 2, at 560.
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The remark by Henry U that an off-duty policeman at the match could, if his
conscience permitted, have taken no part in the events whatsoever, and gone
home with the crowd',37 (emphasis added) reinforces the objection rather than
neutralises it. The clear implication of the 'no choice' argument of Henry U
is that if a civilian helper had worked along side PC Glave and had been
exposed to the same experiences, that civilian's consequent psychiatric injury
would not have been compensatable.
However, it is clear from Frost that certain types of employee may be
expected to have more than 'normal' fortitude: the numbers affected strongly
suggest that ordinary police robustness is not protection against an experience
such as this (a conclusion that would not surprise the doctors)'.38 If the issue
is approached from the point of view of foreseeability, then not only can the
'normal' fortitude rule be sustained, but more than normal fortitude may be
required in certain areas of work. This is consistent with Walker v
Northumberland County Council. 39 It can be argued that it is simply not
foreseeable that psychiatric harm will result. This means that the normal
fortitude rule is being used more harshly in employers' liability cases such as
~~~~~~~~~It~~~~~~~~~
out of allowing recovery by professional rescuers. On the contrary, it has had
the opposite and highly unpalatable effect: police officers possessed of more
than so-called normal fortitude may be compensated in identical
circumstances in which civilians deemed to be less resilient and, therefore,
more likely to be affected, have not been.
It can be asked whether this - what could be called the 'hardened skull'
rule - explains the statement by Rose U that the degree of fortitude to be
expected from an employee will go to the standard of care.40 This reference
to deciding on the standard ofcare is all very well in situations where the only
victims of the employer's negligence are the employees themselves. However,
37 Ibid.
38 Supra n 2, per HenryLJ at 557, and see also the comments ofRose LJ at 551 on the case of DC Hallam being
exposed to excessively horrific events such as were likely to cause psychiatric illness even in a police offi=.
39 [1995] 1AllER737.
40 Supra n 2, at 550.
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where, as here, there are non-employee victims, it means that different
standards of care will apply to the same act of negligence depending upon
whether the victim is an employee or not, and this must surely be an affront
to common sense.
The 'Impact' Rule
Sergeant Smith was not successful because she did not experience the
impact of the event or its immediate aftermath. It was said that she was not
within the area of risk, and that what she subsequently did was no more than
could properly be asked of any police officer in the ordinary carrying out of
her duties following a serious incident.41
The case of Walker v Northumberland County Councit42 confirmed that
damages can be recovered for psychiatric injury when there is no causative
'shocking' event, where the injury was a foreseeable result of an excessive,
stressful workload. The plaintiff in that case was not exposed to physical risk,
so the physical/psychiatric division was irrelevant. However, the impact rule
was used in Frost. 43 Clearly, there had to be a causative event but, given the
fact that the essence of this case was the emphasis on the employer's pre-
existing duty of care, was there any need to use the very restrictive
requirements of the nervous shock impact rule to determine liability?
In Frost, the case ofMount Isa Mines v Pusey was referred to in all the
judgments.44 That case, decided by the High Court of Australia, concerned a
plaintiff who, whilst working as an engineer for his defendant employer, heard
the sound ofan explosion in the same building. He went to the scene and saw
one of the two electricians who had been working on a SWitchboard, severely
burnt. He supported the electrician (with whom he was not acquainted) out
to an ambulance. As a result, the plaintiff became psychiatrically ill. He
41 Supra n2,perRoseLJat551.
42 [1995]1 All ER 737.
43 In his judgment, Rose LJ refers to the successful plaintiffs who were not rescuers (Bevis and Bairstow) as
being in the 'area of risk': supra n 2, at 551-2; and see Henry LJ at 567.
44 [1970]125 CLR 383.
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succeeded in his claim on the basis that it was foreseeable that another
employee in the building would go to the scene. Walsh J said that: '...the fact
that the respondent was an employee was a relevant fact in deciding whether
or not he was a person within "the area of potential danger" or within the area
of risk. ,45 The reference to a geographical or spatial area, therefore, is relevant
in deciding whether a particular person would be there, or likely to go there.
So, if the event takes place at work, or a place where workers are sent (as in
Frost), then those people will be foreseeable as persons who might be injured.
What must be said is that the reference to the 'area of risk' cannot mean only
that the plaintiff and the physically afflicted victim must share some sudden,
shocking event or its immediate aftermath. It is arguable, however, that both
Lord Justices Rose and Henry interpreted it thus, and therefore felt obliged to
exclude the claim of Sergeant Smith, who, it was said, did no more than any
other police officer would have done following 'a serious incident'.46 Although
the serious incident had been caused by her employer's antecedent negligence,
the majority of the judges were applying the 'impact rule' control mechanism
used in nervous shock. This is one of the very control mechanisms that Judge
LJ, dissenting, said should apply to employees, just as they apply to others
(albeit, in his reasoning, by maintaining the primary/secondary victim
distinction and placing the police officers in the latter category).
The question arises as to whether it is helpful to carry out this sort of
mutation of legal principles. It might be said that in Frost Sergeant Smith's
case was being approached from a remoteness of damage analysis which
applies to all torts and, therefore, it was not an arbitrary blend of concepts
from two discrete areas of negligence. This is an attractive way out. But this
not referred to by Rose and Henry LJJ. Furthermore, Rose LJ distinguished
Smith's case by saying that, as she had not been at the ground at the time, 'she
was not therefore within the category of those officers to whom, being within
the area of risk when the incident occurred, a duty of care was owed by virtue
of the master and servant relationship'47 (emphasis added). Despite the pre-
existing relationship, the test, therefore, was one of duty, not remoteness.
45 Supra n 44, at 412.
46 Supra n 2, at 551.
47 Ibid.
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In the other case considered at the same time as Frost, Duncan v British
Coal Corp, the plaintiffdid not succeed because of failure to meet the impact
rule. It will be recalled that he was not present when one of his men was
crushed, and although he arrived at the scene within four minutes, the lack of
geographic proximity was enough to defeat his claim. In Mount Isa Mines v
Pusey,48 although there was still some confusion at the time that the plaintiff
arrived on the scene of the explosion, in the event he was not endangered, and
importantly, it was not suggested that he suffered the injury because of risk of
physical injury to himself. Rose U describes this as a rescue case. But is there
any significant difference between these circumstances and those in Duncan?
An explanation of sorts can be provided by looking at the contractual
obligations of the employees. In Mount Isa Mines, there was no suggestion
that the plaintiff went to the scene to carry out duties required of him by his
contract of employment. On the other hand, Mr Duncan was required to carry
out first aid as part of his job and, as a police officer, Sergeant Smith attended
at mortuaries and so on. It could be argued that they failed in their claims
because witnessing a nasty event was not within the scope of their
employment, but carrying out first aid or other ameliorative duties, as a
consequence of that event, was within the scope of it. However, this is a
highly speculative interpretation, and does not meet the objection that
involvement in such nasty events is within the scope ofa professional rescuer's
employment.
Rescuers
In Frost, Rose and Henry UJ supported the proposition that rescuers are
primary victims,49 whilst, dissenting, Judge U said that sometimes rescuers
were primary and sometimes they were secondary victims. 50 According to
Judge, rescuers who are primary victims are those who are at risk in some way
from the event itself; others may not be at risk but will still be regarded as
rescuers. He cites those people who 'search' for victims, such as Brian
48 Supra n 44.
49 Supra n 2, at 549; and 563.
50 Supra n 2, at 573.
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Harrison, as being properly regarded as rescuers. It is difficult to argue
against this view, given that the most well-known rescuer caseS I containing the
epigrammatic phrase of Cardozo J - 'danger invites rescue' - was just such a
'searcher' case. In that case the plaintiff and his cousin were on one of the
defendant's railway cars, when the cousin was thrown from it by the
defendant's negligent act. The plaintiff went through the darkness to search
for his cousin, and fell and injured himself. Although this case is about
physical injury, the principle at'the heart of it must surely apply to psychiatric
injury too. The plaintiff had been put into a situation by the defendant's
negligence whereby he had to choose between his own well-being and that of
another. In choosing the latter he is injured. It makes no difference whether
the impulse to rescue is instinctive or after due deliberation on the risks
involved. 52
The statement of Judge LJ, that not all rescuers can recover, that is, if
they are secondary victim rescuers, and not in fear for themselves, is
questionable. The rescuer's claim is a free-standing claim based on an
independent right. A rescuer is in a special position because he is owed a duty
even if there was no duty owed to the rescuee. 53 This lends much force to the
argument that the rescuer is always a primary victim. Further, could it ever
be an essential part of the 'rescue principle' that, if there is no fear, then the
degree of courage required is less? This sort of interpretation does not apply
to physically injured rescuers. They may have no fear, because the degree of
danger is not apparent, but if they then suffer physical injury, then the rescue
principle allows them to recover damages. The psychiatrically injured rescuer
may have no fear for precisely the same reason, that is, nothing in the situation
suggests exposure to serious trauma. However, if, say, a body is discovered
which is unexpectedly, and horribly mutilated, surely the same principle
applies? If not, it would mean that a lesser degree of courage is rewarded in
physical injury than in psychiatric injury, which, on any reasoning, must be
unacceptable.
It may be asked why Judge LJ perceives the need for two different
51 Wagner v International Ry Co (1921) 232 NY 176, NY Ct of Apps.
52 Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146, at 158.
53 Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650.
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categories of rescuer. He states that it is unfair to treat professional rescuers
more favourably than civilian rescuers,54 and that surely must be right. The
judgments of Rose and Henry LJJ state that they are not being treated
differently. The advantage given to PC Glave derived from his status as an
employee of the tortfeasor. However, this means that there is an unfair
distinction between the employee/professional and the civilian. Presumably,
the majority judgments are relying on the rarity of such a case as Frost, where
the emergency services themselves are liable in negligence. Nevertheless, the
'rarity' factor is no justification for bad law.
Employers' Vicarious Liability
The employee's duty of care to her fellow employees is fixed by the
general rules of negligence. The employer will simply pick up the vicarious
liability for this, regardless of the lack of primary culpability. However, it
does not affect the standard of care required of the negligent employee. That
this could give rise to difficulties was acknowledged by the High Court in
Mount Isa Mines, but it was unnecessary to resolve these, because the trial
judge had found that there was vicarious and primary·liability.55
The difficulties envisaged in that case, however, would have been
nothing compared with the situation in Frost, as in Mount Isa all the victims
were employees. In contrast, in Frost the victims were both members of the
public and police officers. The implication of the decision is that, if liability
was vicarious, then there was a duty owed by the police officers to their
colleagues in respect of psychiatric illness, but there was no duty owed to the
members of the crowd who were psychiatrically injured by the very same
negligent acts. This is another affront to common sense.
A more coherent classification of plaintiffs?
Negligently inflicted psychiatric injury has given rise to some of the
most tortuous reasoning in the law of negligence and, following Frost, we are
54 Supra n 2 at 574.
55 Supra n 44, at 400-401.
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now contemplating different kinds of primary victim, different kinds of
rescuer and different kinds of fortitude. Furthermore, we are confronted with
the absurd situation whereby those with responsibility for safety at a public
event owe each other obligations of safety that they do not owe to the public
who they are paid to protect. The use of the law of employers' liability has
resulted in nothing but confusion and injustice.
In Mount Isa Mines, it is true that both McTiernan J and Menzies J
stated that the basis of the decision was a breach of an employer's duty of care,
and Barwick CJ referred to the employee coming on the scene 'in the course
of his employment'. But Barwick CJ's purpose in referring to this was to
argue that the employee was in the 'area of foreseeability to be attributed to ...
his employer'. 56 Further, the judgments of Windeyer J and Walsh J make it
clear that the duty owed is not only the duty of an employer: '...1do not wish
to be taken as saying that where a duty of care springs only from foreseeability
of harm to a 'neighbour', and not out of a relationship of status or of contract
such as master and servant, a different result would follow'. 57 Similarly,
Walsh J states:
'... the liability of the appellant does not rest necessarily upon a duty
arising out of the relationship of employer and employee. It rests upon
a finding of a duty owed to all persons of whom it might reasonably be
anticipated that they might suffer injury (of the relevant kind) and upon
a finding that the respondent was such a person. ,58
On this basis there is no more reason to find that PC Glave might
reasonably be anticipated to suffer injury than Brian Harrison.
Furthermore, there must surely be an argument that people like Brian
Harrison were not 'voluntary' participants in the events at Hillsborough that
afternoon. He was not a bystander in the sense that he was standing some
distance away, passively watching something with which he had no direct
connection or concern. He was in the midst of that mayhem; his brother was
56 Supra n 44. at 389.
57 Supra n 44, per Windeyer J, at 404.
58 Supra n 44, at 412.
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somewhere in the crowd and he knew him to be at risk. This is acknowledged
in the judgment of Judge LJ who says that none of the plaintiffs in Alcock
could fairly be regarded as mere bystanders or spectators. However, whilst he
uses this observation to argue that they were secondary victims, and that not
all secondary victims should succeed, it is argued here that because they were
not mere bystanders they should have succeeded. The primary/secondary
distinction is, after all, only an application of the concept of proximity. In his
judgment, Henry LJ states that he prefers the proximity test rather than the
primary/secondary labelling test,59 and it is arguable that the application of the
proximity concept means that 'unwilling participants' such as Brian Harrison
are not disinterested bystanders. Similarly, a plaintiff as in McFarlane vEE
Caledonia,60 would fall into the same category. The definition may be
difficult to frame, and would give rise to some hard cases, but that does not
mean that there is no discernible distinction between true bystanders and those
who are trapped in a situation by their employment or by the human impulse
to search for relatives or friends who may be injured. They should not be
required to establish a close tie of love and affection with such relatives or
friends.
Moreover, consider the additional argument used by Henry LJ in
support of allowing the officers' claims. He states that as a matter of public
policy the police should be encouraged to promote safe practices:
'My emphasis has been on the police officers as direct victims because
of the employer/employee relationship. While that duty of care to them
is a factor in a case such as this where their employer was negligent, I
would expect a duty to be owed to them by any defendant who caused
such a disaster as this. Deterrence is part of the public policy behind
tort law'.61 (emphasis added).
59 Supra n 2, at 561.
60 [1994] 2 All ER I. The plaintiff was on a support vessel 550 metres away from the Piper Alpha oil rig
explosion. Although employed by the defendant he was off duty at the time and, although he carried out some
helpful tasks, was not found to be a rescuer. In consequence, the Court of Appeal treated him as a mere
bystander.
61 Supra n 2, at 567.
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Although the suggestion is that the police were owed a duty which may
not have been owed to others, it is arguable that he was referring to a general
duty to all rescuers. However, it is clear that the safe practices, which should
be encouraged, are not only about protecting people in the position of police
officers. They are also about protecting everyone in attendance at public
events where there is a responsibility, paid for by the public and the organisers
of those events, for ensuring the safety of those people in attendance. The
public policy argument, therefore, has no exclusive relevance to rescuers,
professional or otherwise. Moreover, the argument lends support to the view
that those who had bought tickets for a peaceful recreational occasion, on the
understanding that they would be safe, should not be owed a lesser duty of
care than those officers who were paid to be there. It is suggested that the
adoption of the 'unwilling participant' category would avoid at least some of
these difficulties.
Conclusion
It has not been the purpose of this article to suggest that it was wrong
to compensate these police officers. However, the emphasis the majority
judgments placed upon the fact that different principles of law were being
applied and that police officers were not being singled out for preferential
treatment, does nothing to remove the unjust disparity between the decisions
in Alcock and Frost. Furthermore, some of the reasoning in Frost only adds
to the confusion in an area already filled with artificiality and the arbitrary use
of judicial concepts. It is suggested that this unjust farrago might, to some
extent, be avoided by a more coherent approach to the duty of care to avoid
negligently caused psychiatric injury, so that PC Glave and Brian Harrison fall
into the same legal category. Ifpsychiatric injury unaccompanied by physical
injury is to be treated differently from physical injury, then, regardless of
whether it arises from a pre-existing relationship, there should be parity
between claims of victims.
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